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Investigating the impact of publicly announced information security breaches on 
corporate risk factor disclosure tendencies 
Abstract 
As the reported number of data breaches increase and senators push for more disclosure regulation, the 
SEC staff issued a guidance in 2011 on disclosure obligations relating to cybersecurity risks and 
incidents. More recently, on February 26, 2018 the SEC Commission issued interpretive guidance to help 
assist public companies prepare disclosures regarding cybersecurity risks and incidents. As reported 
incidents of cybersecurity breaches occur, investors are concerned about the risks associated with these 
incidents and the impact they may have on financial performance. Although the SEC staff guidance warns 
public companies to make timely disclosure, recognizing the threat that cybercrime poses to investors in 
the public markets, it does not go far enough to institute direct measures that would compel companies 
to reveal the nature and scope of a cybersecurity breach. 
In light of the lack of specific guidance on cybersecurity disclosure, the aim of this study is to develop a 
better understanding of the cybersecurity disclosure landscape. The purpose of this study is 
phenomenological in nature, designed to assess the impact of the 2011 SEC staff guidance on the 
disclosure of cybersecurity risk factors and provide recommendations for future research following the 
2018 SEC Commission’s interpretive guidance. This study analyzes the impact of the SEC guidance by 
investigating risk factor disclosures both before and after the SEC’s 2011 issuance date. We pay 
particular attention to organizations that have suffered a data breach, as determined by the Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse (PRC). The study uses companies listed on the S&P 500. 
Results show that there has been a 23 percent increase in the number of firms referencing cybersecurity 
in the Risk Factor section of the 10-K and that factors such as the size of the firm, prior reported breaches 
and breach type were predictors of disclosure. The study also found that there is a tendency not to 
disclose reported breaches in the narrative of the 10-K and that the cybersecurity risk factor disclosures 
do not include details on actual breaches. The underreporting of cyber incidents may be in part be the 
result of alternative interpretations of what constitutes a “material” breach. This study should be of 
interest to the SEC, in particular, as they continue to evaluate cybersecurity guidance in terms of its 
implementation by corporate filers and as they move toward a cybersecurity disclosure regulation. In 
addition, as the SEC continues to scrutinize cybersecurity incident disclosures and issue comment letters 
to public companies with inadequate disclosures, it should be of interest to corporate filers, as well as to 
investors, analysts and other professionals that are concerned with the informativeness of corporate 
cybersecurity disclosures particularly as they affect profits. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
As cybersecurity threats and incidents become more widespread, 
investors, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) and other 
stakeholders are increasingly concerned with how this information is disclosed in 
public company filings. In a letter signed by five Senators in 2011, the senators 
suggested that, “inconsistencies in reporting, investor confusion, and the national 
importance of addressing cyberspace security” demand that the SEC “issue 
guidance regarding the disclosure of information security risk, including material 
network breaches” (Rockefeller et al. 2011). Just five months after the letter’s 
release, the SEC staff issued its first guidance on the topic of cybersecurity.  
The SEC staff guidance, issued on October 13, 2011, requires all public 
companies to disclose cybersecurity events if they materially affect the 
company’s products, services, relationships or competitive condition. The 
guidance indicates, “Material information regarding cybersecurity risks and cyber 
incidents is required to be disclosed when necessary in order to make other 
required disclosures, in light of the circumstances under which they are made, not 
misleading” (SEC 2011). More recently, on February 26, 2018, the SEC 
Commission issued interpretive guidance to assist public companies preparing 
disclosures regarding cybersecurity risks and incidents, “in light of the increasing 
significance of cybersecurity incidents” (SEC 2018). This guidance reinforces and 
expands upon the 2011 SEC staff guidance. 
The importance of such guidance is of particular interest to investors in 
publicly traded companies as reports of cybersecurity incidents are occurring with 
more frequency in high profile public companies. According to the Identity Theft 
Resource Center (ITRC) there were 1,579 reported data breaches in 2017 alone 
(ITRC 2017). This list includes large publicly traded companies such as Equifax, 
Yahoo, Verizon, Intercontinental Hotels Group, Arby’s, VeriFone, and other 
highly identifiable named companies.  
For public companies, the 2011 SEC staff guidance requires disclosure of 
material adverse cyber incidents. Studies suggest that companies underreport 
these events due to differing interpretations of the meaning of materiality (Young 
2013). The 2011 guidance intent was to increase disclosures on cybersecurity risk 
for public companies. Concerns voiced by senators suggest that the 2011 
disclosure guidance is insufficient for investors (Rockefeller 2013), that it is too 
general and that it does not provide clear instructions on what constitutes a 
material breach. Without clear guidelines, executives exercise judgment when 
determing materialtiy, resulting in discrepancies in interpretation and the 
underreporting of cybersecurity events. Thus, our first research question 
investigates whether cybersecurity risk factor disclosures increased in light of the 
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 SEC 2011 staff guidance particularly for those companies that have suffered a 
cybersecurity breach. 
Although to date, the SEC has only brought one regulatory enforcement 
action against a company for failure to disclose a massive cybersecurity breach 
(SEC Altaba 2018), the SEC has been active in this area by issuing comment 
letters asking public companies to amend their corporate filings. Beginning in 
2012, the SEC issued comment letters to approximately 50 public companies 
concerning cybersecurity compliance (White 2013). Pressure from the SEC has 
prompted at least two of these companies to disclose information on known 
security breaches in their SEC filings (i.e., Amazon and Google) (Sandler 2012), 
and others were told to improve their disclosure on cyber-risks (i.e., American 
International Group, Inc., Eastman Chemical Co. and Quest Diagnostics Inc.). In 
addition to the SEC, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has enforced its 
authority using Section 5 of the FTC Act that prohibits “unfair or deceptive trade 
practices” FTC (2016) by pursuing companies for alleged cyber security incidents 
(i.e., LifeLock, ChoicePoint, Twitter, Wyndham Hotels, Dish Network, TJX 
Companies, etc.) (Giorgianni 2017).  
The consequences of these cybersecurity incidents has affected many 
stakeholders resulting in investors filing class action lawsuits against some of 
these companies (e.g. Equifax - over 50 class action lawsuits have been filed 
(Giorgianni 2017); CareFirst, Inc. – class action suit filed in 2015 (Sherman 
2015)). Most recently, Yahoo agreed to pay $80 million to settle a class action 
lawsuit that alleged that Yahoo failed to disclose four data breaches affecting over 
3 billion customers (Muncaster 2018) and Anthem agreed to pay $115 million to 
settle lawsuits from its 2015 data breach (Chew, Newby, Fenwick &West 2017).  
Based on the increase in SEC comment letters regarding cybersecurity risk 
factors, the increase in class action lawsuits against companies with cyber 
incidents, and the requirement that registrants report cyber incidents if material 
(including prior incidents), the second research question investigates whether 
companies that have had past cybersecurity breaches are more likely to include a 
cybersecurity risk factor in their annual report post 2011 SEC staff guidance. 
With the pervasiveness of technology, material cyber incidents pose a 
threat to all companies regardless of industry. Some industries may be at a higher 
risk than others; particularly if they gather personally identifiable information. 
Beyond the SEC requirements, some industries have other regulatory bodies 
requiring disclosure for certain types of breaches (e.g. Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) for healthcare companies, Payment 
Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI-DSS) for retailers, etc.). Thus, our 
third and fourth research question investigates whether type of breach or industry 
has an impact on cybersecurity risk factor disclosure. 
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 Existing SEC laws require registrants to list in their financial statements a 
variety of risk factors that could have a material impact on their businesses. 
Although no existing SEC disclosure requirements specifically refer to 
cybersecurity, disclosure requirements, as written, “may impose an obligation on 
registrants to disclose such risks and incidents” (SEC 2011). The purpose of this 
phenomenological study is to evaluate cybersecurity disclosure tendencies in light 
of the 2011 SEC staff guidance on cybersecurity risk disclosure. The significance 
of the study is to extend existing knowledge of cybersecurity disclosure for large 
public companies and to present ideas for future research post 2018 SEC 
Commission’s interpretive guidance.  
The study uses 10-K information provided on companies listed on the 
Standard & Poor’s list of the 500 large-cap American companies (S&P 500) to 
answer research questions related to the informativeness of cybersecurity risk 
disclosure,  Specifically, the research questions test whether (1) the quantity of 
cybersecurity risk disclosure for S&P 500 companies has significantly improved 
in light of the SEC’s new disclosure requirement, (2) any relationship exists 
between corporate 10-K cybersecurity disclosures and the number and type of 
cybersecurity breaches reported by the Privacy Rights Clearing House (PRC) and 
(3) specific variables such as company size, industry, breach type, and presence of 
prior or current year breach impact, the disclosure of cybersecurity breaches. 
The literature review below provides information on the dearth of 
information published on cybersecurity disclosure. This study contributes to the 
literature on cybersecurity disclosure by providing insights into current disclosure 
practices and suggesting areas for future research. 
The paper is organized as follows: in the following section we review 
studies published on cybersecurity and identify the research questions that are 
applicable to this study; in the subsequent section we discuss our research 
methodology including the sample selection and statistical analysis used and the 
results of our analyses are reported and discussed; finally, we conclude with a 
discussion including implications of our study, suggestions for future research and 
limitations. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
DEVELOPMENT 
Risk Factor Disclosure Studies 
Beginning in 2005, the SEC required all public firms to include a Risk 
Factor section in their 10-K which discusses “the most significant factors that 
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 could make the company speculative or risky” (SEC 2005). In 2011 and then 
again in 2018, the SEC issued additional Risk Factor guidance to all public firms 
regarding disclosure obligations relating to cybersecurity risks and cyber 
incidents. Included in this guidance is the requirement for registrants to disclose 
under Risk Factors in the 10-K, the risks the company faces in regards to 
cybersecurity incidents. Within this guidance, the SEC warns companies to “avoid 
generic boilerplate disclosure” (SEC 2018).   
Previous studies have investigated Risk Factor content in the annual 
report. Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu & Steele (2014) examine information 
content of risk factor disclosures following the 2005 SEC ruling by analyzing 10-
K reports downloaded from the Edgar database. They find that firms with more 
risk exposure disclose more risks and the type of risk determines how much 
content is included to describe that risk. In addition, they suggest that disclosures 
are not boilerplate but instead are firm specific and useful to investors. Wang, 
Kannan & Ulmer (2013) find that disclosed risk factors with “risk-mitigation 
themes” are less likely to be related to future breach announcements. Similarly, 
Li, No & Wang (2018) find that the association between the presence of 
cybersecurity risk disclosure and subsequently reported cybersecurity incidents 
become insignificant after the passage of the 2011 cybersecurity guidance.  
Other descriptive studies suggest that the 2011 guidance underachieves.  
Using case studies and SEC comment letters, Ferraro (2014) suggests that the 
guidance underachieves because it is “vague, similar across industries and 
companies, and bring little information to the marketplace” thus it fails to resolve 
the information symmetry problem it was aimed at correcting. In a Harvard Law 
School Forum investigating cybersecurity risk disclosures of Fortune100 
companies following the 2011 SEC staff guidance, the post revealed that the 
depth and nature of cybersecurity disclosures varied greatly suggesting that there 
is still much room for improvement on cybersecurity risk disclosure (Klemash, 
Brorsen & Seets 2017). 
The 2011 SEC staff guidance was issued with the goal of increasing 
cybersecurity risk disclosures by public companies. The guidance specifically 
states that material cybersecurity risks and incidents must be disclosed in the 10-
K. Studies have shown that companies underreport events particularly due to 
alternative interpretations of the definition materiality (Young 2013). 
To date, there have been no empirical studies investigating the link 
between reported cybersecurity incidents and risk factor disclosures. In light of 
the increasing scrutiny of cybersecurity disclosures by the SEC of public 
companies with reported breaches (e.g. Amazon and Google) there is a need for 
studies investigating cybersecurity disclosures in public company filings. The 
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 following section identifies the importance of cybersecurity disclosure research 
and presents the research questions addressed in the study. 
Research Question Development 
 Although there are no formal SEC rules or regulations addressing 
cybersecurity disclosure, a number of existing disclosure requirements may 
impose an obligation on registrants to disclose such risks and incidents. For 
example, the SEC Act of 1933 includes Item 503(c) of Regulation S-K, which 
requires public companies to disclose “the most significant factors that may 
adversely affect the issuer’s business, operations, industry or financial position or 
its future financial performance” (SEC 1933). The SEC Act of 1934 requires 
publicly traded companies to report certain “material events” to shareholders in 
the Form 8-K if “deemed important to shareholders” (SEC 1934). Beginning in 
2005, the SEC mandated all public companies to include a “risk factor” section in 
their annual 10-K” (SEC 2005) and in 2011, the SEC issued new risk factor 
disclosure obligations that focus on cybersecurity risks specifically (SEC 2011).  
The 2011 SEC guidance is consistent with other disclosure requirements 
mandated by federal securities laws associated with any significant business risk. 
However, the risks associated with cybersecurity go beyond generic risks that 
could apply to all SEC registrants. The new guidance suggests disclosures should 
focus on the unique facts and circumstances related to specific, material 
cybersecurity risk. In light of the increase in cyber incidents to public companies 
and the requirement to disclose material cyber incidents in the 10-K we would 
expect cybersecurity risk factor disclosure to increase since the 2011 guidance 
release. Which leads to research question one: 
RQ1: Have cybersecurity risk factor disclosures in the Risk Factors 
section of the annual 10-K increased after the SEC issued the disclosure 
guidance? 
Prior studies on corporate disclosure suggest that managers have a self-
serving bias to disclose favorable information about the firm (Campbell et al. 
2014) and are likely biased against providing unfavorable disclosures (Kothari, Li 
& Short 2009). Since risk factor disclosure such as those provided on 
cybersecurity are designed to relay information regarding unfavorable risks and 
uncertainties of the firm, it is likely that the SEC guidance on cybersecurity 
disclosures may prompt managers to provide vague and/or boilerplate disclosures. 
For example, according to the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (PRC 2018), Yahoo 
has incurred several data breaches between 2012 and 2016. In 2013 it suffered a 
data breach originally estimated to impact 1 billion users (in 2017 Yahoo upped 
this estimate to 3 billion), in 2014 it suffered yet another data breach impacting 
over 500 million users and in 2017 it warned of an ongoing investigation that 
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 impacted its 2015 and 2016 customers).  In Yahoo’s 2013, 2014, and 2015 10-K 
filings, although they include a cybersecurity risk factor, they fail to provide any 
information on the actual data breaches they incurred. Instead, the risk factor 
provided in the 10-k for all 3 years is a boilerplate disclosure that reads: 
Interruptions, delays, or failures in the provision of our services could 
damage our reputation and harm our operating results. 
Delays or disruptions to our service, or the loss or compromise of data, 
could result from a variety of causes, including the following:  
•  Our operations are susceptible to outages and interruptions due to fire, flood, 
earthquake, tsunami, other natural disasters, power loss, equipment or 
telecommunications failures, cyber attacks, terrorist attacks, political or social 
unrest, and other events over which we have little or no control. We do not have 
multiple site capacity for all of our services and some of our systems are not 
fully redundant in the event of delays or disruptions to service, so some data or 
systems may not be fully recoverable after such events. 
If our security measures are breached, our products and services may be 
perceived as not being secure, users and customers may curtail or stop using 
our products and services, and we may incur significant legal and financial 
exposure. 
Our products and services involve the storage and transmission of Yahoo’s 
users’ and customers’ personal and proprietary information in our facilities and 
on our equipment, networks and corporate systems. Security breaches expose 
us to a risk of loss of this information, litigation, remediation costs, increased 
costs for security measures, loss of revenue, damage to our reputation, and 
potential liability………... If an actual or perceived breach of our security 
occurs, the market perception of the effectiveness of our security measures 
could be harmed and we could lose users and customers (Yahoo 2013, 2014, 
2015). 
It is not until the 2016 that Yahoo actually identifies in its 10-K that it had a data 
breach and it only highlights the 2014 incident with no specific details relating to 
the number of customers impacted or the cost of the breach. 
Our security measures may be breached as they were in the Security 
Incidents and user data accessed, which may cause users and customers 
to curtail or stop using our products and services, and may cause us to 
incur significant legal and financial exposure. 
Our products and services involve the storage and transmission of 
Yahoo’s users’ and customers’ personal and proprietary information in 
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 our facilities and on our equipment, networks, and corporate systems. 
Yahoo is routinely targeted by outside third parties, including technically 
sophisticated and well-resourced state-sponsored actors, attempting to 
access or steal our user and customer data or otherwise compromise user 
accounts. We believe such a state-sponsored actor was responsible for 
the theft involved in the 2014 Security Incident………..We take steps to 
prevent unauthorized data disclosure or access to our systems; however, 
because the techniques used to obtain unauthorized access, disable or 
degrade service, or sabotage systems change frequently or may be 
disguised or difficult to detect, or designed to remain dormant until a 
triggering event, we may be unable to anticipate these techniques or 
implement adequate preventative measures. Breaches of our security 
measures, such as the Security Incidents, or perceived breaches, have 
caused and may in the future cause, the market perception of the 
effectiveness of our security measures to be harmed and could cause us to 
lose users and customers, or detrimentally affect our relationships with 
distribution partners, service providers, vendors and app developers 
(Yahoo 2016). 
Interestingly, the SEC’s first enforcement order issued in April 2018 was 
against Yahoo for failure to disclose a material cybersecurity breach and this 
order has some common links with the new cybersecurity guidance that was 
issued in 2018 (SEC 2018a). For example, the new guidance stresses the 
importance of board risk oversight and specifically states that “the risk 
management process should provide important information to investors about 
how a company perceives the role of its board and the relationship between the 
board and senior management in managing the material risks facing the company” 
(SEC 2018). In the order against Yahoo, the SEC found that the company’s “risk 
factor disclosure in its annual and quarterly reports from 2014 through 2016 were 
materially misleading in that they claimed the company only faced the risk of 
potential future breaches” (SEC 2018a) when in fact a massive data breach had 
already occurred. In addition, the SEC found that Yahoo’s senior management 
and legal teams did not share information regarding the data security breach with 
Yahoo’s outside auditors or outside counsel (SEC 2018a).   
  Similarly, Amazon incurred a data breach in 2011 caused by a password 
security flaw.  In Amazon’s 2011 10-K filings, there is no mention of the breach. 
Instead, the risk factor provided in the 10-k is a boilerplate disclosure that reads: 
We Could Be Harmed by Data Loss or Other Security Breaches 
As a result of our services being web-based and the fact that we process, store 
and transmit large amounts of data, including personal information, for our 
customers, failure to prevent or mitigate data loss or other security breaches 
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 could expose us or our customers to a risk of loss or misuse of such 
information, adversely affect our operating results, result in litigation or 
potential liability for us and otherwise harm our business. Although we have 
developed systems and processes that are designed to protect customer 
information and prevent data loss and other security breaches, such measures 
cannot provide absolute security. In addition, we rely on third party technology 
and systems in certain aspects of our businesses, including for encryption and 
authentication technology to securely transmit confidential information 
(Amazon 2011). 
Home Depot also suffered a breach in 2010 as a result of credit card 
information being stolen via a skimming device. In Home Depot’s 2010 10-K 
filings, there is no mention of the breach. Instead, the risk factor provided in the 
10-K is a boilerplate disclosure that reads: 
If we do not maintain the security of customer, associate or company 
information, we could damage our reputation, incur substantial additional 
costs and become subject to litigation. 
Any significant compromise or breach of customer, associate or company 
data security could significantly damage our reputation and result in 
additional costs, lost sales, fines and lawsuits. The regulatory environment 
related to information security and privacy is increasingly rigorous, with 
new and constantly changing requirements applicable to our business, and 
compliance with those requirements could result in additional costs. There is 
no guarantee that the procedures that we have implemented to protect 
against unauthorized access to secured data are adequate to safeguard 
against all data security breaches (Home Depot 2010). 
The SEC guidance clearly states that “registrants should provide 
disclosure tailored to their particular circumstances and avoid generic boilerplate 
disclosure” (SEC 2011). However, these generic cybersecurity risk factor 
disclosures are clearly not informative about Yahoo’s, Amazon’s or Home 
Depot’s specific cybersecurity risks. Instead, it illustrates that cybersecurity risk 
factor disclosures are used to highlight all possible risks and uncertainties 
regardless of the likelihood that they will impact the firm. Similar examples of 
boilerplate cybersecurity disclosures can be found in many other corporate filings 
(e.g. Best Buy, McDonalds, Lockheed Martin, Netflix, etc.). 
Companies have many reasons for not disclosing cyber incidents 
(reputation, brand strength, market position, ability to raise capital, etc.). 
However, companies may face legal incentives to provide meaningful, firm 
specific cybersecurity risk factors particularly if a known material cybersecurity 
risk comes to light. If companies fail to disclose the known cybersecurity risk, 
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 they could face sanctions by the SEC. For example, in 2012, the SEC sent letters 
to six companies (Amazon.com, American International Group Inc. (AIG), 
Eastman Chemical Co., Google, Hartford Financial Services Group Inc., Quest 
Diagnostics Inc.) identifying inadequacies of cybersecurity risk disclosures in 
their annual reports. The SEC determined that these firms did not go far enough to 
inform investors of the risk of cyber-attacks and did not disclose the fact that such 
attacks had occurred (Ferraro 2014). For example, Amazon’s risk factor reported 
in their 2011 10-K read: 
We Could Be Liable for Breaches of Security 
……Although we have developed systems and processes that are designed to 
protect customer information and prevent fraudulent transactions, data loss and 
other security breaches, failure to prevent or mitigate such breaches may 
adversely affect our operating results (Amazon 2011). 
In the SEC comment letter to Amazon, the SEC asks Amazon to explain 
their cybersecurity risk factor disclosure as it relates directly to the 2011 guidance 
“in light of the fact that your subsidiary [Zappos] has actually experienced this 
cyber attack” (SEC 2012). At first Amazon protested claiming that “information 
on the specific incident would not provide investors with additional material 
information relating to the cyber-attack risks” (SEC 2012). After persistence from 
the SEC, Amazon was compelled to change their cybersecurity risk factor in 2013 
addressing the fact that some its subsidiaries had past security breaches. 
We Could Be Harmed by Data Loss or Other Security Breaches 
………We use third party technology and systems for a variety of reasons, 
including, without limitation, encryption and authentication technology, employee 
email, content delivery to customers, back-office support, and other functions. 
Some subsidiaries had past security breaches, and, although they did not have a 
material adverse effect on our operating results, there can be no assurance of a 
similar result in the future. Although we have developed systems and processes 
that are designed to protect customer information and prevent data loss and other 
security breaches, including systems and processes designed to reduce the impact 
of a security breach at a third party vendor, such measures cannot provide 
absolute security (Amazon 2013). 
Thus, in light of the importance that the SEC is placing on cybersecurity 
risks disclosure and the SEC’s disclosure guidance published in 2011, it would be 
expected that corporate filers would be more cognizant of providing firm specific 
cybersecurity risk factor disclosure in their 10-K particularly when the firm has a 
reported cybersecurity breach in the same year. Which leads to our second 
research question: 
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 RQ2: Are companies that have reported cybersecurity breaches (as 
documented by the PRC) prior to or in the year of the SEC disclosure 
guidance, more likely to provide a cybersecurity risk factor in the 10-K 
under risk factors? 
With the pervasiveness of technology, material cyber incidents pose a 
threat to all companies regardless of industry. Some industries may be at a higher 
risk than others particularly if they gather personally identifiable information. 
Beyond the SEC requirements, some industries have other regulatory bodies 
requiring disclosure for certain types of breaches (e.g. Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) for healthcare companies, Payment 
Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI-DSS) for retailers, etc.). Thus, our 
third and fourth research question investigates whether type of breach or industry 
has an impact on cybersecurity risk factor disclosure. 
RQ3: Does the type of reported cybersecurity breach (as documented by 
the PRC) have an impact on cybersecurity risk factor disclosure in the 
annual 10-K? 
RQ4: Does the industry in which the company operates (using the SEC 
SIC codes) have an impact on cybersecurity risk factor disclosure in the 
annual 10-K? 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Sample and Data  
Our sample uses companies listed on the S&P 500. We obtain financial 
statement data from S&P’s Research Insight (i.e., Compustat). Security breach 
data is collected on these companies from the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse 
(PRC) website (privacyrights.org).  The PRC is a nonprofit corporation that 
reports data security breaches made public since 2005. The database compiles 
breach information from various governmental agencies and other verifiable 
media sources such as Open Security Foundation list-serve, Databreaches.net, 
Personal Health Information (PHI) Privacy, National Association for Information 
Destruction (NAID) and the California Attorney General.  
We identify firms involved in breaches reported by the PRC and match 
these firms to our list of S&P 500 firms. We manually collected for each data 
breach, the type of breach (as identified by the PRC - hacking or malware, 
unintended disclosure, payment card fraud, insider, physical loss, etc.), date of 
breach, information source, estimated cost of the breach and other relevant 
information. We match the reported data security breaches to companies listed on 
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 the S&P 500. We then collect cybersecurity and data breach disclosure data from 
SEC financial filings in the 10-K both pre and post the issue date of the SEC 
disclosure guidance by performing content analysis. We eliminated 87 S&P 500 
firms with missing financial data in one or both of the 10-Ks, yielding a sample 
size of 413 firms. Table 1, Panel A below presents the demographics of the 
sample. Manufacturing represents the largest portion of the sample (160 
companies 39 percent) followed by Finance (69 companies 17 percent) and 
Services (49 companies 12 percent). The average size of the firms measured by 
total assets for 2010 (2011) is $12,179 ($14,138) million.  
 
Table 1 
Panel A: Sample data by industry 
Industry N % 
Average Total Assets 
($Millions) 
2010 2011 
Mining 30 7%         18,368      20,562  
Construction 4 1%           5,521        6,221  
Manufacturing 160 39%         24,248      25,986  
Transportation, 
Communication, Electric, 
Gas & Sanitary Services 61 15%         33,286      33,336  
Wholesale & Retail Trade 40 10%         16,571      17,816  
Finance, Insurance & Real 
Estate 69 17%       192,126    197,579  
Services 49 12%         13,725      15,255  
Total 413 100%         51,030      53,090  
Median             12,719      14,138  
 
Cybersecurity Risk Factor Frequency Analysis for RQ1 
Cybersecurity incidents pose threats that not only the affect public 
corporations but also investors and the capital markets. The SEC, highlighting the 
importance of cybersecurity risk disclosure, issued a guidance in 2011 prompting 
public companies to be more forthcoming when disclosing cybersecurity risks. 
The SEC’s guidance focused on addressing discrepancies in disclosure practices 
among public companies. Thus, we would expect cybersecurity risk factor 
disclosures to increase as a result of the 2011 guidance.  Therefore, for RQ1, we 
examine whether cybersecurity risk factor disclosures increased after the SEC 
issued the disclosure guidance. 
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 We explore RQ1 by performing content analysis. Content analysis is a 
research technique for “making replicable and valid inferences from tests (or 
other meaningful matter) to the context of their use” (Krippendorff, 2004, pg. 18). 
Content analysis is considered appropriate for the analysis of companies’ annual 
reports (Beretta & Bozzolan 2004; Linsley & Shrives 2006). We do a keyword 
search for any/all references to cybersecurity (e.g. cybersecurity, cyber-security, 
cyber-attack, data security, information security, security breach, breach, security, 
security incident, etc.) and document where and how it is reported in the 10-K.  
Table 2 below shows the number of S&P 500 companies disclosing a 
cybersecurity risk factor in their 10-K during periods before (2010) and after 
(2011) the date of the SEC guidance. Results show that during this period, 
cybersecurity risk disclosures in the risk factor section of the 10-K increased by 
23 percent for our sample. In 2010, there were 188 (46 percent) organizations that 
included a cybersecurity risk factor in their 10-K and in 2011 there were 283 (69 
percent) organizations.  
 
Table 2 
Companies disclosing a cybersecurity risk factor pre and post SEC CF Disclosure 
Guidance: Topic No. 2 – Cybersecurity. 
Fiscal Year N 
Cybersecurity 
Risk Factor 
Disclosure 
Mean StdDev Min Max 
2010 413 
188 
0.455  0.498  0  1  
46% 
2011 413 
283 
0.685  0.465  0  1  
69% 
* t-test, increase in number of companies providing cybersecurity risk factor disclosure significant 
at p <0.000 (t=10.049); Mann Whitney U test significant at p<0.000 (z=6.673) 
These results suggest that the 2011 guidance, issued by the staff, does not 
go far enough to encourage disclosure and shows that public companies are 
underreporting cybersecurity incidents (note that “staff statements are nonbinding 
and create no enforceable legal rights or obligations of the Commission or other 
parties” but are important in the development of rules and regulations issued by 
the SEC Commission) (Clayton 2018). However, the 2011 guidance was 
considered necessary because at that time it was issued, there were no existing 
disclosure requirements addressing cybersecurity specifically. More recently, in 
2018 the SEC voted to approve a statement and interpretive guidance on public 
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 company cybersecurity disclosures. The 2018 guidance, issued by the commission 
itself, carries more weight (note that only the SEC Commission has the ability to 
“adopt rules and regulations that have the force and effect of law”) (Clayton 
2018), than the 2011 staff guidance. The Commission’s guidance addresses 
specific criteria for determining whether a breach is material, discussions on 
timing of when a breach should be disclosed and board oversight responsibilities. 
The goal of the guidance is to promote “clearer and more robust disclosure by 
companies about cybersecurity incidents, resulting in more complete information 
being available to investors” (SEC adopts 2018).  
With the release of this new guidance, future research could investigate 
whether the clarifications provided in the 2018 interpretive guidance has had a 
meaningful impact on corporate cybersecurity disclosure tendencies post 
issuance. In particular, future studies could investigate how the 2018 guidance 
influenced the interpretation of materiality by corporate filers (including an 
analysis of the probabilities used to assess the likelihood of an incident 
occurring), the timeliness and the specific details disclosed following a breach, 
changes in cybersecurity risk factor disclosures (ensuring companies are 
providing specific details instead of merely boilerplate disclosures) and changes 
to corporate governance procedures as they relate to the mitigation of 
cybersecurity risks. 
 
Cybersecurity Risk Factor Disclosure Determinant Analysis for RQ2 
Next, we use our sample firms and match them against the list of public 
companies that have suffered a data security breach as reported by the PRC. The 
PRC has been tracking data breaches made public (via newspapers and other 
media) since 2005 and this report is available to the public. Using this report, for 
RQ2, we explore whether firms that have had a prior data security breach are 
more likely to disclose a cybersecurity risk factor in their 10-K.  
Table 3 below provides descriptive details on the actual number of 
breaches and disclosure information for our sample years. For 2010, we 
determined that 33 (8 percent) organizations from our sample had documented 
breaches. Of those 33, 18 (55 percent) included a cybersecurity risk factor in their 
annual 10-K and none provided disclosure of the actual breach anywhere within 
the 10-K. For 2011, we determined that 29 (7 percent) organizations from our 
sample had documented breaches. Of those 29, 19 (66 percent) included a 
cybersecurity risk factor in their annual 10-K.  
Of those organizations in 2011 that had a reported breach, 2 (7 percent) 
disclosed actual information regarding the breach in their annual 10-K. EMC 
Corporation reported the breach in their cybersecurity risk factor, the results of 
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 operation and the notes to the financial statements (included in the footnote was a 
customer remediation charge of $66.3 million).  Note that the breach was related 
to their RSA Information Security Segment. Fidelity National Information 
Service, Inc. reported the breach in the business section, cybersecurity risk factor 
and the notes to the financial statements (included in the footnote was an 
estimated loss of $13 million related to the breach).  
 
Table 3 
Descriptives on actual breach data as reported by the PRC. 
 
We then explore RQ2 by examining whether the presence of a prior 
reported cybersecurity breach is related to the likelihood of a firm disclosing a 
cybersecurity risk factor in the 10-K by employing a binary logistic model. 
Classical linear regression models are not valid for binary dependent variables. 
Logistic regression (developed by David Cox in 1958) allows us to estimate the 
odds of a binary outcome based on one or more explanatory variables. Peng, So, 
Stage & St John (2002) suggest a minimum number of observations for logistic 
regression should be about 100; therefore, our sample size of 413 is adequate for 
this methodology. Our model for RQ2 includes measures of size, presence of a 
prior year breach and presence of a current year breach. 
 We estimate the following binary logistic regression model to investigate 
RQ2: 
DISCL  =  𝑎1 + β1  (SIZE) + β2 (PRIORBREACH) + β3 
(CURRENTBREACH)  
Where the dependent variable DISCL is a binary indicator variable equal 
to 1 if the company included a cybersecurity risk factor in the current fiscal year 
and 0 otherwise; SIZE is a control variable measured by the log of total assets; 
PRIORBREACH is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm had a prior 
reported breach as reported by PRC (between 2005 and 2009), or otherwise 0; 
CURRENTBREACH is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm had a reported 
breach in the reported year (2010 or 2011), or otherwise 0. 
Fiscal 
Year
N
Total Number of 
Reported Breaches in 
Reporting Year
Number of Companies 
with Reported Breach 
with Cybersecurity 
Risk Factor Disclsoure
Number of Companies 
providing actual 
disclosure of breach
Total Number of 
Reported Breaches 
up to and including 
Reporting Year
33                                  18                                  0 144                          
8% 55% 0% 35%
29                                  19                                  2                                    173                          
7% 66% 7% 42%
2011 413
2010 413
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 We report descriptive statistics for the variables used to conduct our test of 
RQ2 in Table 4, Panel A (B) of Table 4 reports various univariate descriptive 
statistics for year 2010 (2011) of our sample. To test the determinants of 
disclosure, we used binary logistic regression.  Table 4, Panel C presents the 
correlations of the variables under study. 
Table 4 
Panel A: 2010 Sample Descriptive Statistics 
(n=413)  
Variable Mean Median StnDev 
DISCL     0.455  0.000      0.498  
SIZE (LogTA)     4.185      4.113      0.624  
CURRENTBREACH     0.030  0.000      0.171  
PRIORBREACH     0.088  0.000      0.284  
TYPE     3.878  3.000      2.177  
INDUSTRY     4.162  4.000      1.701  
 
Table 4 
Panel B: 2011 Sample Descriptive Statistics (n= 413) 
Variable Mean Median StnDev 
DISCL     0.685      1.000      0.464  
SIZE (LogTA)     4.262      4.156      0.826  
CURRENTBREACH     0.027  0.000      0.164  
PRIORBREACH     0.101  0.000      0.032  
TYPE     4.206  4.000      1.739  
INDUSTRY     4.162  4.000      1.701  
 
Table 4 
Panel C: Correlations Table 
  
DISCL PRIOR 
BREACH 
CURRENT 
BREACH 
SIZE TYPE INDUSTRY 
DISCL 1           
PRIOR 
BREACH 
.187** 1        
CURRENT 
BREACH 
0.046 -.105** 1       
SIZE .094** .173** .135** 1     
TYPE .190** .598** .498** .297** 1   
INDUSTRY .356** .180** .151** 0.067 .245** 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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 Table 5 presents the results of our binary logistic regression analysis for 
RQ2 on the choice to disclose a cybersecurity risk factor. We run this model for 
the year prior to the issuance of the guidance (2010) and the year of the guidance 
(2011). We used Wald statistics to test the significance of the Log Regression 
Coefficients for each of our independent variables.  
As noted in Table 5 - Panel A, the results of the 2010 analysis indicate a 
positive and statistically significant (p=.012) relation between prior reported 
breaches and the choice to disclose a cybersecurity risk factor suggesting a higher 
propensity to disclose a cybersecurity risk factor disclosure in the 10-K if the 
organization had a prior reported cybersecurity breach.  The SIZE of the company 
as measured by the log of total assets was marginally significant (p=.074) and 
PRIORBREACH was not significant.  
 
Table 5 
Panel A: Logistic Regression Analysis RQ2 (2010) 
 
 
Similarly, the results for 2011 as shown in Table 5 – Panel B indicate a 
statistically significant (p=.001) relation to prior reported breaches and the choice 
to disclose a cybersecurity risk factor where the log odds of a company reporting 
a cybersecurity risk factor was positively related to having a prior reported 
breach. These results may provide an indication that the 2011 Cybersecurity 
Guidance is having a positive and significant impact as more companies that have 
suffered a cybersecurity breach in the past are including in their disclosures a 
cybersecurity risk factor. However, beyond the risk factor section, specific 
disclosures related to an actual security breach remains insufficient. The SIZE of 
the company and having a current year breach was not significant.  
 
 
Independent Variables B SE B e
B
SIZE (LogTA) 0.313* 0.175 1.367
CURRENTBREACH 0.767 0.480 2.152
PRIORBREACH 0.708** 0.283 2.031
Constant -1.657
Cox & Snell R Square 0.047
Nagelkerke R Square 0.063
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, ****p<.001
χ2 = 19.915, p<.001 with df=3
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 Table 5 
Panel B: Logistic Regression Analysis RQ2 (2011) 
Independent 
Variables 
B SE B eB 
SIZE (LogTA) -0.020 0.139 0.980 
CURRENTBREACH 0.532 0.584 1.703 
PRIORBREACH 1.063**** 0.330 2.894 
Constant 0.661     
χ2 = 14.737, p<.01 with df=2     
Cox & Snell R Square 0.042     
Nagelkerke R Square 0.056     
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, ****p<.001 
 
 
The results showing that size does not influence disclosure is not 
surprising, as prior research shows, public companies underreport events due to 
alternative interpretations of the definition of materiality (Young 2013). Young 
argues that without further guidance on what constitutes a material event, it is not 
surprising the materiality threshold remains subjective. In addition, there is a 
reluctance by public companies to report security breaches for fear of alarming 
stakeholders and possibly affecting stock prices. Without regulations enforcing 
disclosure, it is likely that this trend will persist.  
The findings that companies with a prior reported breach are more likely 
to include a cybersecurity risk factor is of interest and the fact that the 
significance is much stronger in 2011 may suggest that the guidance is 
influencing disclosure. Since materiality must be considered throughout the 
cybersecurity disclosure decision, future research should investigate the best way 
to define materiality to see if there are any measures that could best be used to 
determine when a material cybersecurity breach must be disclosed.  
Young (2013) proposes that the SEC “should institute dollar and 
percentage of assets thresholds for determining materiality.” Following Young, 
future research should investigate legal proceedings issued referencing materiality 
(e.g. references to Regulation S-K) to determine how materiality has been defined 
in the courts and use this information to develop a materiality framework that 
would help eliminate inconsistencies in the interpretation of materiality. Future 
research could also investigate public company cybersecurity incident disclosure 
based not only on quantitative factors (some cybersecurity incidents are so large 
and impactful, disclosure is unavoidable – Anthem, JPMorgan Chase, Home 
Depot, Target, Sony, etc.) but also on qualitative factors which are more difficult 
to measure (e.g. reputation damage and loss of consumer confidence). 
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 Cybersecurity Risk Factor Disclosure Determinant Analysis for RQ3 
We next investigate whether the type of breach has an impact on risk 
factor disclosure. For RQ3, we explore whether the type of reported cybersecurity 
breach is related to the likelihood of a firm disclosing a cybersecurity risk factor. 
We use PRC’s data breach classifications. The classifications include: Payment 
Card Fraud (CARD) this involves debit and credit card fraud; Hacking or 
Malware (HACK) this involves fraud as a result of an outside party or malware; 
Insider (INSD) this involves fraud from someone with legitimate access; Physical 
Loss (PHYS) this includes paper documents that are lost or stolen; Portable 
Device (PORT) this includes lost, discarded or stolen physical devices (i.e. laptop, 
PDA, smartphone, etc.); Stationary Device (STAT) this includes non-mobile 
devices; Unintended Disclosure (DISC) this includes fraud not involving hacking, 
intentional breach or physical loss (e.g. sensitive information posted publicly, 
mishandled electronic information, etc.); and Unknown (UNKN).  
We estimate the following binary logistic regression model to investigate RQ3: 
DISCL  =  𝑎1 + β1  (SIZE) +  β2 (TYPE) 
Where TYPE is a categorical variable ranging from 1 to 8. Using TYPE as part of 
this exploratory research is particularly useful in identifying trends and in 
establishing benchmarks for future comparison. We run this model for the year 
prior to the issuance of the guidance (2010) and the year of the guidance (2011). 
Table 6 presents the results of our binary logistic regression analysis for RQ3. We 
used Wald statistics to test the significance of the Log Regression Coefficients for 
each of our independent variables.  
 Table 6, Panel A provides details on the TYPE of breach by year (2005-
2011) for our sample companies as reported by the PRC. Trends show that from 
2005 through 2009 that breaches classified as PORT made up the majority of the 
reported breaches (ranging from 15 percent to 63 percent). In the years 2010 
breaches classified as INSD and DISC made up the majority of the reported 
breaches (21 percent and 33 percent respectively) and in 2011 breaches classified 
as HACK, PORT and STAT made up the majority of the breaches (21 percent, 21 
percent and 34 percent respectively).  
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 Table 6 
Panel A:  
Breakdown of TYPE of breach by year 
TYPE 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
CARD 0 0 0 1 2 2 4 9 
HACK 1 2 2 2 2 6 10 25 
INSD 0 5 5 2 4 11 3 30 
PHYS 0 1 0 2 0 4 6 13 
PORT 7 18 19 8 2 1 0 55 
STAT 1 3 1 2 0 0 6 13 
DISC 3 5 3 1 3 7 0 22 
UNKN 0 3 0 1 0 2   6 
Total 12 37 30 19 13 33 29 173 
 
 Table 6, Panel B presents the results of our RQ3 analysis. For 2010, the 
results show that the log of the odds of a company disclosing a cybersecurity risk 
factor was positively and significantly related to breaches classified as HACK 
(electronic entry by an outside party, malware or spyware) (p=.019) suggesting a 
higher likelihood to disclose a cybersecurity risk factor disclosure in the 10-K. 
SIZE was also positively and significantly associated with the likelihood to 
disclose a cybersecurity risk factor (p=.049).  
 Breaches classified as CARD, INSD, PHYS, PORT, STAT and DISC 
were not factors in predicting disclosure. Hacking is one of the most common 
methods used by thieves to steal personally identifiable information, so it is not 
surprising that breaches classified as HACK had a positive and significant impact 
on cybersecurity risk disclosure. 
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 Table 6 
Panel B: Logistic Regression Analysis RQ3 (2010) 
 
 For 2011 (Table 6 – Panel C), breaches classified as DISC (sensitive 
information posted publicly on a website, mishandled, or sent to the wrong party 
via e-mail, fax, or mail) were marginally significant (p=.074) suggesting a higher 
likelihood to disclose a cybersecurity risk factor disclosure in the 10-K. However, 
the size of the organization as well as breaches classified as INSD, PHYS, PORT 
and STAT were not factors in predicting disclosure.  
Table 6 
Panel C: Logistic Regression Analysis RQ3 (2011) 
Independent Variables B SE B eB 
SIZE (LogTA) -0.015 0.142 0.985 
INSD 0.650 0.664 1.915 
PHYS -0.453 0.676 0.636 
PORT 0.630 0.417 1.878 
STAT 0.902 1.105 2.464 
DISC 1.893* 1.058 6.641 
Constant 0.704     
χ2 = 15.051 p<.05 with df=6     
Cox & Snell R Square 0.036     
Nagelkerke R Square 0.050     
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, ****p<.001 
 
Independent Variables B SE B e
B
SIZE (LogTA) 0.363** 0.184 1.438
CARD 0.215 1.293 1.239
HACK 2.487** 1.058 12.029
INSD 0.723 0.587 2.061
PHYS -1.860 0.794 0.830
PORT 0.201 0.365 1.223
STAT -1.261 1.074 0.283
DISC 0.455 0.601 1.576
Constant -1.804
Cox & Snell R Square 0.059
Nagelkerke R Square 0.079
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, ****p<.001
χ2 = 25.302, p<.001 with df=8
20
Journal of Cybersecurity Education, Research and Practice, Vol. 2019, No. 2 [2019], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/jcerp/vol2019/iss2/3
 Cybersecurity Risk Factor Disclosure Determinant Analysis for RQ4 
 Our final analysis looked at disclosure relative to industry type. For RQ4 
we review cybersecurity risk factor disclosures by looking for certain industry-
specific trends. We estimate the following binary logistic regression model to 
investigate RQ4: 
DISCL  =  𝑎1 + β1  (SIZE) +  β2 (INDUSTRY) 
Where INDUSTRY is a categorical variable ranging between 1 and 8 based on 
SIC codes as reported by the SEC (see Table 1 for industry descriptive statistics). 
Results (not tabulated) indicated that for 2010 and 2011 companies classified as 
Wholesale & Retail Trade and Services were positively and significantly related 
to disclosure of cybersecurity risk factors (p=.001 and p=.000 respectively; 
p=.048, p=.077 and p=.001 respectively) suggesting a higher likelihood to 
disclose a cybersecurity risk factor disclosure in the 10-K. These results may be 
related to data breach notification laws directly affecting retailers, particularly as 
it relates to the handling of consumer data.  
For 2010 and 2011 Companies classified as Manufacturing were 
negatively and significantly related to disclosure of cybersecurity risk factors 
(p=.000). Note that a large percentage of our sample size represents 
manufacturing firms (39%). Cyber-attacks against manufacturing firms are on the 
rise; this in part may be the result of companies in this industry not upgrading 
their overall cyber security systems thus becoming an easier target. Overall, all 
firms have an incentive not to disclose damages suffered from a data breach 
because 1)there are no specific reporting regulations requiring disclosure and 2) 
due to concerns of possibly turning away potential or existing customers, 
litigation and damaging their reputation or stock value. 
 Some industries may be more susceptible to cybersecurity breaches than 
others. The IBM 2016 Cyber Security Intelligence Index ranked healthcare 
organizations as number one for reported breaches followed by manufacturing 
firms, financial services, and government and transportations firms (2019 IBM X-
Force 2019). The healthcare sector maintains a large amount of personal 
information (e.g., name, social security number, payment information etc.) that 
criminals consider valuable, therefore, it is not surprising that healthcare 
organizations are a prime target. In addition, manufacturers are often the target of 
cyber-attacks as many facilities use dated legacy equipment that were not 
designed with security in mind. Although all industries are vulnerable to cyber-
attacks, some industries may be more susceptible than others. Thus, including 
INDUSTRY as part of this exploratory research is particularly useful in 
identifying trends and in establishing benchmarks for future comparison. As 
industries have different cybersecurity risk factors, future research should 
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 investigate cybersecurity incident disclosure from an industry standpoint and 
compare/contrast the variables that prompt disclosure. 
 
DISCUSSION, FUTURE RESEARCH AND LIMITATIONS 
 “Given the frequency, magnitude and cost of cybersecurity incidents” on 
public companies, the SEC was compelled to take actions to protect investors 
(SEC 2018). As a first step, the SEC staff issued a guidance in 2011 addressing 
the actions that public companies should take to inform investors about material 
cybersecurity risks and incidents. More recently, on February 26, 2018, the SEC 
Commission issued interpretive guidance to aid public companies with their 
cybersecurity disclosures. It is important to note that both guidance advisories 
target not only companies that have suffered a cybersecurity breach but also those 
that might be subject to material cybersecurity risks. This study examined the 
impact of the SEC’s 2011 guidance on cybersecurity risk factor disclosures. The 
results suggest that companies seem to have responded cautiously to the SEC’s 
2011 Cybersecurity Risk Factor Guidance. For our sample companies, there was 
an overall 23 percent increase in the number of organizations that included a 
cybersecurity risk factor in their annual 10-K report after the SEC issued its 
disclosure guidance. Factors that influenced disclosure included the size of the 
organization, whether the firm had any prior reported breaches as documented by 
the PRC and type of breach. Of particular interest to this study is the lack of 
disclosure in the narrative of the 10-K by companies that have suffered an actual 
breach. From our sample companies, only two companies in 2011 that had a 
reported breach actually disclosed information on the breach in their annual 10-K. 
 As the SEC ramps up its investigations of public companies for 
insufficient disclosure of cybersecurity risks and actual breaches through 
enforcement actions and comment letters, it presents an opportunity for future 
research. Throughout this manuscript, we have addressed several areas that 
warrant future research relating to cybersecurity disclosure. Next, we present 
some additional suggestions for future research in this area. 
 Future research should include descriptive studies that examine the 
issues identified in the SEC’s enforcement actions and comment letters and 
compare these to the advice provided in the cybersecurity guidance. As noted 
previously, there is a certain level of consistency between the issues identified in 
the Yahoo enforcement order and the 2018 SEC cybersecurity guidance. Given 
that the CEO and CFO have to certify the effectiveness of the internal controls 
and the adequacy of controls and procedures for identifying cybersecurity risks 
and incidents, the findings of such a study should of interest to public companies 
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 particularly as they reevaluate they cybersecurity risk profile and ramp up their 
board risk oversight on cybersecurity. 
 Similarly, future research should address questions that Board of 
Directors (BOD) will face regarding their roles and responsibilities for 
cybersecurity. For example, how does the SEC cybersecurity guidance impact 
board risk oversight? Are the BOD’s formally assigning responsibility for 
cybersecurity at both the board and the management level? Do the BOD have 
access to cybersecurity experts? Do the company’s disclosure controls and 
procedures provide for an early warning system when a breach occurs? Does the 
board understand how cybersecurity risks integrate into the company’s overall 
risk management programs? How will the SEC cybersecurity guidance and 
investor interest impact future cybersecurity risk disclosures? 
 As the SEC moves towards a cybersecurity disclosure regulation (versus 
a guidance) for reported events of information security breaches, more 
information is needed to identify the strengths and weaknesses of current 
disclosure tendencies. This study is the first step in identifying how organizations 
are currently reporting 1) the risk of cybersecurity breaches and 2) the actual 
details of cybersecurity breaches. Future research should investigate cybersecurity 
disclosures behavior post 2018 Commission guidance based on general deterrence 
theory. General deterrence theory suggest that the perceived likelihood of being 
caught and the perceived severity of the punishment are likely to be key decision 
factors for disclosure. Unless some legal action is initiated by the SEC (through 
regulation) or by stockholders for underreporting cybersecurity risks, it is likely 
that cybersecurity risks/breaches will go unreported. Although the 2011 staff 
guidance poses no risk of punishment for underreporting cybersecurity, the 2018 
guidance may prompt the SEC to issue sanctions against public companies. 
Cybersecurity disclosure remains one of the hot topics for the SEC.  
 Future research should also include contextual studies looking 
specifically at cybersecurity risk factor disclosures to determine whether the 
information provided by organizations are informative or merely boilerplate 
paying close attention to those firms that have suffered an actual breach as 
reported by the PRC. Other studies may investigate the intentional underreporting 
of cybersecurity events resulting from agency theory - as it may be in the interest 
of management to understate cybersecurity risk particularly if the firm is 
performing poorly. Future studies on cybersecurity may also benefit by 
investigating whether a firm’s disclosure practices are consistent with the actual 
cybersecurity it faces. This would involve interviewing management to better 
understand how a firm assesses cybersecurity threats and its disclosure decisions 
relating to both actual breach disclosures and future cybersecurity risk. Still other 
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 behavioral research ideas could examine whether current disclosure is informative 
enough to aid in investor decision making. 
 It is important to note that public companies have requirements beyond 
the SEC guidance to disclose public breaches particularly when it involves 
consumer’s personally identifiable information. Over 46 of the 50 US states 
currently have consumer protection laws requiring disclosures beyond the 10K. 
Most recently, the European Union (EU) issued the EU General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR). The regulation addresses data protection and privacy for all 
individuals within the EU as well as the export of personal data outside the EU. 
There are numerous laws protecting individuals’ personal data (Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act, HIPAA, FTC, GDPR, etc.). Future research should investigate how 
these consumer protection laws influence corporate disclosure of cybersecurity 
incidents. 
 This study should be of interest to the SEC as Jay Clayton, chairman of 
the SEC acknowledged in a public statement on cybersecurity on Sept 20, 2017 
that “cybersecurity is critical to investors, market participants our markets and the 
Commission itself.” He went on to state that the commission “will continue to 
evaluate this [CF Disclosure] guidance…and its impacts on issues and capital 
markets (SEC Public Statement Clayton 2017).” The SEC cybersecurity guidance 
notes that material cybersecurity risks and incidents must be disclosed. The SEC 
chairman states that he expects companies to take seriously their obligation to 
disclose material information about cyber risks and events and as a result, he 
expects the SEC staff to comment more on cybersecurity disclosures over the next 
year (SEC Speech Clayton 2017).  Therefore, with the increased focus by the SEC 
on cybersecurity and the recently issued guidance advisories, it is important to 
evaluate the adequacy of public company disclosures regarding cybersecurity 
particularly as it relates to investors. 
 As with all research, our study is not without limitations. The first 
limitation is with regards to the sample which includes only S&P 500 firms. 
Selecting S&P 500 firms results in a sample of large firms, thereby limiting the 
generalizability of the results to smaller firms. Future researchers are encouraged 
to replicate these results amongst a data set that includes both large and small 
firms. The second limitation is with regards to the usage of the PRC’s breach 
dataset. We cannot be certain that the PRC has captured all breaches for 
companies identified in our sample. In addition, we rely on the 10K for breach 
disclosures reported by our sample companies, which may also be a limiting 
factor. Some companies may not disclose a breach if they are not required by 
law/regulations and/or because of negative implications to their stakeholders. As 
the SEC is moving towards disclosure regulations, future research could test the 
effectiveness of such regulations. Regardless of the aforementioned limitations, 
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 we are confident that these limitations do not weaken our analysis or alter our 
study’s findings.  
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